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PLANNING FOR THE INCOME OF AN ESTATE
AND ITS HEIRS*
WILBUR H. FRIEDMAN & GERALD SILBERTt
I. INTRODUCTION
THE problem of tax planning for an estate and its heirs has received
increasing attention in recent years.' While the estate planning
problem has received attention primarily from the estate and gift tax
viewpoint, the present discussion is limited to the income tax problems
involved. It should be borne in mind that income tax planning should
never shape the testamentary plan. The plan of disposition contem-
plated by the testator should first be determined and then put into effect
with the minimum tax consequences.
In order to plan intelligently, one should know the cost basis, hold-
ing period and present value of all assets owned by the testator and
the prospective heirs, and the income tax brackets of the testator, of his
potential estate (only a rough estimate, of course) and of the prospec-
tive heirs. -
With these facts and the desired disposition in mind, the two major
principles of estate income tax planning to be applied are: (1) create
as many different taxpayers as possible in order to reduce the over-all
surtax of the estate and heirs; and (2) arrange for distribution to, or
retention of, taxable income by taxpayers with the largest amount of
income tax deductions.'
* This paper was prepared in connection with a lecture delivercd by Mr. Friedman
at the New York University Sixth Annual Institute on Federal Taxation and appears in
that publication.
t Members of the New York Bar.
1. Fillman, Tax Planning For the Income of a Decedent and His Estate, Firmr A, ,.L
LNSTiTuTE Ox FxnERAL TAXATION, NEW YORK UNU'ERsrry 76 (1947); Guterman, Income
of Decedents-New Problems in Income and Estate Taxes tnder Section 126, Foun=r
AN-NUAL INsTuTE oN FFDmERAL TAXATiON, NEw YoRr U sNnTxsri 24 (1946); Mandell,
A Tax Guide for Estate Planning, 25 TAXs 418 (1947); Shepherd & Pruyn, Some Federal
Tax Aspects of Will Draftsmanship, 25 TAxEs 433 (1947).
2. The term "estate" will be used throughout this article to mean "estate and heirs"
unless the context otherwise requires.
3. The operation of these principles will be discussed infra (Parts IV and V), dealing
with possible will provisions and the distribution of income by estates and trusts.
1
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II. INTER VIVOS CONSIDERATIONS
A. Partnership Interests
Inter vivos considerations, other than the preparation of a will, affect
the income tax of the estate. One of these considerations is the nature
of the business interest of the decedent. In a case of a partnership,
special problems result from Section 126 of the Internal Revenue Code
(introduced in the 1942 Revenue Act), which provides that where the
estate receives sums to which the decedent was entitled but which were
not reportable in the last return of the decedent and which would have
been income if they had been received by the decedent, the amounts
are subject to income tax to the estate in the same manner as they
would have been taxed to the decedent.4
From this viewpoint, the estate prefers to receive payments on account
of an interest of the decedent in a partnership as payments for the
capital or good will5 since such payments would be received without any
income taxY From the survivors' viewpoint, payments made out of cur-
rent income for the acquisition of the decedent's interest in the capital
and good will of the partnership would not reduce taxable income.7
Thus, in conflict with, the desire of the estate, the surviving partners
prefer to continue the estate in the partnership and to make payments
to the estate as the distributive share of partnership income (rather
than as the purchase price of tangible or intangible assets), in order
to reduce the income taxable to the surviving partners.' Payments of
4. The history and operation of § 126 are fully discussed in Guterman, op. cit. supra
note 1. The statute was designed to lessen the tax burden on the decedent's last income
tax return in cases where, under the pre-1942 law, amounts accrued by reason of death
(including decedent's share of profits on unbilled and unfinished work of a partnership
of which the decedent was a member) were taxed to the decedent.
5. The regulations, U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.126-1 (1943), provide that amounts
received on account of the decedent's interest in tangible assets of a partnership are
not subject to tax under § 126. Amounts received on account of decedent's interest In
profits not includible in the decedent's last return are subject to § 126 tax (cf. Estate of
Thomas F. Remington, 9 T. C. 99 (1947), dealing with decedent's interest in insurance
commissions-not a partnership case). Amounts received on account of intangible assets
are not specifically covered, but it would seem that such assets should be treated In the
same manner as tangible assets, and should not be subject to tax under § 126. See Guter-
man, op. cit. supra note 1, at 34-35.
6. Estate of George R. Nutter, 46 B. T. A. 35 (1942) ; City Bank Farmers Trust Co.,
29 B. T. A. 190 (1933). While the decedent would have had to pay an income tax on
payments for capital or good will in excess of his basis therefor, the estate acquires a new
basis (estate tax value) for these items, but not for income items.
7. H. Lewis Brown, 1 T. C. 760 (1943), aff'd, 141 F. 2d 307 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
8. Charles F. Coates, 7 T. C. 125 (1946); Richard P. Hallowell, 39 B. T. A. 50 (1939).
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this type received by the estate would be subject to income tax.
These problems exist in mercantile partnerships as well as in per-
sonal service partnerships, although more acute in the latter. In a mer-
cantile partnership, if payments in addition to payments for the capi-
tal of the decedent are to be made, income tax to the estate could per-
haps be avoided if such payments were made for good will."0 Whether
the partnership agreement can or should provide for such payments
as being for good will, or as being the decedent's share of profits on un-
billed and unfinished work, or as being the distributive share of part-
nership income, depends upon the substantive business transaction
among the partners worked out with the income tax consequences in
mind.
In the case of a personal service partnership, the problem is more
acute since capital is usually a small item. While it has been stated
that ordinarily there is no good will in a personal service partnership,"
even in such a case designation of the payments in the agreement as
being for good will has permitted the estate 'to receive such amounts
free of income tax. 2 Whether such a provision should be incorporated
in the partnership agreement again depends on the substantive business
arrangement.
Where payments are made of the decedent's interest in uncollected
fees'" the estate will be taxed on such payments under Section 126. The
9. Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935); Estate of Frederic C. Bellinger, P-H
1946 TC Mxar. Dac. Sx-v. fI 46,040 (1946). See also James Wesley McAfee, 9 T. C. 720
(1947).
10. In the example given in the regulations, it is indicated that payments made of the
decedent's share of the profits on unbilled and unfinished work, apparently even in the
case of a mercantile partnership, are subject to tax under § 126 when received by the
estate. A solution from the viewpoint of the estate, suggested in the text, is that instead
of -making payments for the decedent's interest in profits on unbilled and unfinihed
work, such payments be made for good will. Whether such handling could be squared
with the substantive desire of the parties as to the amount to be paid to the estate would
have to be worked out in each case. If payments are to be made for the decedents interest
in profits on unbilled and unfinished work in addition to payments for the capital account
and good will, then the estate would (under the regulations) pay income tax on the
amount designated as being for the decedents share of the profits on unbilled and un-
finished work. To lessen the tax burden on the survivors, it is suggested that the estate
continue in the partnership and receive equivalent amounts as the distributive share of
partnership income. See discussion below of Raymond S. Wilkins, 7 T. C. 519 (1946), afJ'd,
161 F. 2d 830 (C. C. A. 1st 1947).
11. See Charles F. Coates, 7 T. C. 125, 134 (1946).
12. See cases cited in notes 6 and 7 supra.
13. The term "uncollected fees" as hereafter used in this article means billed but un-
collected fees, unbilled fees, and decedent's interest in unfinished work.
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estate would ordinarily prefer that the partnership agreement provide
that such payments be made over a period of years to avoid bunching
the income into one or two years, thereby subjecting it to high surtax
brackets. If such payments are made pursuant to agreement executed
prior to death, the income tax to the estate may not be under Section
126 since under the agreement the decedent would not have been en-
titled to the payments.1" If there is no agreement prior to death and the
estate makes an agreement after death for periodic payments of the de-
cedent's interest in uncollected fees, there might be a tax to the estate
in the year such agreement is made on the full amount to be received
over the years.' 5 Such a disposition of the problem is therefore unsatis-
factory.
Where an estate can be continued as a member of the partnership,
there is ordinarily no conflict between the desire of the estate to receive
payments over a period of years and the desire of the survivors to get a de-
duction from income for the payments to the estate, since the surviving
partners would not be subject to tax on income paid to the estate as the
distributive share of partnership income.'; On the other hand, if the
estate cannot be continued as a partner," then it is preferable from the
survivors' viewpoint that the partnership dissolve upon the death of a
partner, followed by liquidation of the partnership. In such case there
are no double taxation problems, whereas payments made by surviving
partners under a partnership agreement for the decedent partner's in-
14. The major difference between taxation of the income under § 126 and under tile
general provisions of the Code is that, in the case of income taxed under § 126, there Is
a deduction for the proportionate part of the federal estate tax which has been paid
on the capitalized value of such income.
15. Under § 126 an estate transferring a right to receive income in respect of a dece-
dent is taxed on the fair market value of the right in the year of such transfer, Under this
provision, the agreement between the estate and the surviving partners dealing with tile
decedent's interest in the uncollected fees might be deemed a transfer within the meaning
of the statute subject to tax in the year the agreement was made. See Guterman, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 40.
16. Charles F. Coates, 7 T. C. 125 (1946).
17. In many personal service partnerships continuation of the estate as a partner may
be prevented by the ethics of the profession. In at least one case this obstacle seems to
have been surmounted. See John G. Madden, P-H 1946 TC MEme. DEc. SERe. ff 46,158 (1946).
See also Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States, 5 P-H 1948 FED. TAX SERv.
ff 72,307 (D. C. Mass. 1948). In this case an insurance brokerage partnership agreement
provided for the executors to continue in the partnership. The court held that tile income
from the partnership when received by the executors was ordinary income and further
that when the income was distributed by the executors to the residuary trusts, the execu-
tors were entitled to a deduction for the distribution under § 162(c) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.
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terest in uncollected fees were held not deductible by the surviving
partners where the estate of the deceased partner was not a member of
the continuing partnership.' 8 In Raymond S. Wilkins"0 the partnership
agreement provided for payments to a deceased partner's estate of a
portion of his percentage of the partnership profits for a period of two
years preceding the date of death. The surviving partners contended
that their taxable income should be reduced by the payments made pur-
suant to this agreement. The court recognized that such payments were
not for the acquisition of the decedent's interest in the firm, but held
that the taxable income of the survivors could not be reduced by the
payments on the ground that the payments were the purchase price of
the decedent's interest in uncollected fees, and served only to provide
a cost basis for such uncollected fees to be deducted from such fees
when collected by the surviving partners.
This method of handling the situation is unsatisfactory since it re-
quires detailed bookkeeping, including valuation of the unfinished work
on the date of death and apportionment of receipts to the work done
before and after date of death. The payments made to the estate must
further be allocated to the decedent's interest in all uncollected and un-
billed work as of the date of death, and particular receipts must be
matched against such allocated amounts to determine what part of such
receipts is taxable income. Moreover, it is by no means clear that in
some situations there may not be a double tax. The Wilkins case
assumes that all payments to the estate will be made prior to the collec-
tion of the fees in which the decedent had an interest at the date of his
death. But it is possible (and even likely) that the fees will be collected
before all the payments to the estate are made, in which case the sur-
viving partners would be obligated to seek tax relief by claiming a de-
duction to the extent that the basis of the decedent's interest in fees
collected during the taxable year (which basis was obtained by pay-
ments to the estate made during the taxable year and prior years)
exceeds the decedent's interest in fees collected during the taxable year.
There is no authority for the allowance of such a deduction other than
a dictum in the Wilkins case, and even if the deduction were allowable,
whether it would provide full tax relief would depend on varying fac-
tors such as the income of the partners for the particular year, the tax
rate, etc.
In view of these problems, where the estate or heirs cannot be con-
tinued in the partnership, the survivors would be best off by dissolving
18. Raymond S. Wilkins, 7 T. C. 519 (1946), aff'd, 161 F. 2d 830 (C. C. A. 1st 1947).
19. Ibid.
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the partnership on a death and liquidating it. This method has its
headaches too; in the case of a large partnership; there may be a dozen
or more old partnerships being liquidated at the same time.20 As
pointed out above, the liquidation method may conflict with the desire
of the estate or heirs to avoid the concentration of income in one or two
years.
Apart from the above problems, consideration should be given to the
question whether the partnership should be continued to the end of its
regular accounting period despite the death of one of the partners dur-
ing the year. Whether such a provision would be effective to prevent
dissolution of the partnership with the death of a partner depends upon
local law. In Darcy v. Commissioner2 the partnership agreement pro-
vided that in the event one of the partners died the partnership con-
tinued until the end of the fiscal year and the estate of the deceased
partner continued to be credited with profits or charged with losses until
that date. The decedent died on June 11, 1924. The fiscal year of the
partnership ended on August 31, 1924. The partnership books were
not closed on the date of death, but were closed August 31, the end
of its accounting period. The Commissioner asserted a deficiency in in-
come tax by including in the decedent's last return a pro rata portion
to the date of his death of the partnership's income for the fiscal year.
The second circuit held that in spite of the provision continuing the part-
nership to the end of its fiscal year, the partnership was dissolved under
New York law at the date of death. The Commissioner's action in in-
cluding in the decedent's last return his pro rata portion of the profits
up to the date of death was sustained.
However, in Henderson's Estate v. Commissioner22 the court held
that where the partnership agreement provided for the continuation of
the partnership to the end of its normal accounting period such provision
would be given effect. In this case the decedent at the time of his death
was a member of a Louisiana partnership. The partnership agreement
provided that the partnership was to continue, despite the death of a
partner, to the end of its normal accounting period. The partnership
was on an accrual basis and the decedent on a cash basis. Both re-
ported on a calendar year basis. The decedent died June 21, 1939. From
the beginning of the partnership year to the date of decedent's death,
the partnership had a loss of which decedent's share was $22,000. From
the date of death to the end of the partnership year, the partnership
20. See Estate of George W. Wickersham, 44 B. T. A. 619, 621 (1941).
21. 66 F. 2d 581 (C. C. A. 2d 1933).
22. 155 F. 2d 310 (C. C. A. 5th 1946), reversing 4 T. C. 1001 (1945).
[Vol. 17
1948] THE INCOME OF AN ESTATE
had income of which decedent's share was $56,000. The estate reported
income of $34,000 for the period from the date of death to the end
of the year on the ground that since the partnership was continued to
the end of the year the income from the partnership taxable to the estate
had to be computed on the basis of the full year of partnership oper-
ations. The Commissioner contended that the loss of $22,000 had to be
taken on the decedent's last return and that the estate's share of part-
nership income of $56,000 was taxable to the estate. On the strength
of the partnership agreement, the fifth circuit overruled the Commis-
sioner and the Tax Court and held that the estate need only report the
net income of $34,000 from the full year of partnership operations.I
From the estate's viewpoint,2 4 if such a provision has the effect under
local law of continuing the partnership without dissolution by reason of
the death, there are advantages in its use. Where the taxable years
of a partnership and a partner differ, the death of a partner (in a case
where the partnership does not continue to the end of its fiscal year)
may result in the income of two partnership years being taxed in the de-
cedent's final return. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner2 such a
result was approved by the Supreme Court." In this case the partner
23. Cf. Robert E. Ford, 6 T. C. 499 (1946). In this case one partner in a three-man
partnership withdrew in 1938, the remaining two partners purchasing the withdrawing
partner's interest. In 1941 the partnership sold assets, and the two surviving partners
claimed a-loss computed with respect to the partnership's basis of the assets. The Com-
missioner contended that the basis of the assets sold had to be reduced as to the one-
third interest acquired by the two partners from the withdrawing partner in 1938, by
reference to the amount paid by the remaining partners for such interest, allocated to the
assets sold. The court held that, despite the withdrawal, the partnership continued, and
the partnership's basis of the assets was unchanged. In Allan S. Lehman, 7 T. C. 108
(1946), aff'd, 165 F. 2d 383 (C. C. A. 2d 1948), the court followed the Ford case and
held that the death of one partner did not dissolve the partnership for the purpose of
computing the holding period of a surviving partner's interest in the partnership. A dis-
senting opinion was filed, citing the Darcy case, and distinguishing the Ford case on the
ground that in the Ford case there was a withdrawal of a partner, whereas both the Darcy
and Lehman cases dealt with the death of a partner.
24. From the surviving partner's viewpoint, whether the death of a partner results
in closing the partnership tax year depends upon whether the death results not only in a
dissolution of the partnership, but also in a termination of partnerhip activities and the
immediate liquidation of partnership assets. Unless prior to the end of the normal ac-
counting period, the partnership business is terminated and the assets liquidated, the sur-
viving partners would (despite the death) report their share of partnership income on
the basis of accounting regularly employed by the partnership and by the individual
partners, other than the decedent. Compare Mary D. Walsh, 7 T. C. 205 (1946), with Anne
Jacobs, 7 T. C. 1481 (1946).
25. 303 U. S. 493 (1938).
26. Accord, Louis Karsch, 8 T. C. 1327 (1947).
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reported on a calendar year basis, the partnership on a fiscal year basis.
After the end of the fiscal year of the partnership, but before the end
of the calendar year, the partner died. The Supreme Court held that
the decedent's last return must include his share of the partnership in-
come for the partnership's fiscal year ending in the calendar year of
the partner's death, and in addition his share of the partnership income
for the period from the end of the partnership's fiscal year to the date
of death. Such concentration of income might be avoided by the provi-
sion suggested.
One disadvantage of such a provision is the elimination of the possi-
bility of having the partnership income for the year of death split be-
tween two taxpayers, the decedent and the estate. If a partner dies
during the fiscal year of the partnership, in the absence of such a pro-
vision, the decedent's share of the income of the partnership up to the
date of death would be taxed to the decedent and his share of the part-
nership's income for the balance of the partnership's fiscal year would
be taxed to the estate." This splitting of income between two taxpay-
ers2 8 might result in a lower surtax on the partnership income. Con-
tinuation of the partnership to the end of its normal tax year, if effec-
tive under local law, would result in all the decedent's share of the part-
nership income for the partnership's fiscal year being taxed to the estate,
probably in higher surtax brackets. On the other hand, this disadvan-
tage might be mitigated by distribution of the partnership income by
the estate to the heirs, thereby splitting the partnership income among
several taxpayers.29
B. Corporations
Because of the stockholder's limited interest in the income of a cor-
poration prior to the declaration of a dividend, many of the above prob-
lems disappear if the decedent's business is in corporate form. In such
case there would be no income from the corporation which would be
subject to tax to the estate under Section 126 except for compensation
thereafter paid for services rendered prior to death3" and for dividends
having an ex-dividend date prior to the date of death.31 The earnings of
27. Assuming that the partnership agreement provides for payments to the estate of
the deceased partner's share of partnership profits for the balance of the partnership tax
year.
28. Where, as in the Henderson case, the partnership has a loss to the date of the part-
ner's death, such splitting would be disadvantageous.
29. See discussion of income of an estate during the period of administration in part V
infra.
30. See I. T. 3840, 5 P-H 1947 FED. TAX SERV. II 76,118 (1947).
31. Cf. Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 393 (1945).
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the corporation might be reflected in the price for which its stock is sold,
but the amount received for the stock would not be subject to tax under
Section 126.32
Moreover, conducting the business in corporate form might enable the
corporation to make payments to the widow of the decedent without
subjecting the payments to income tax in the hands of the recipient
even though the corporation deducts the amounts paid as business ex-
penses. 3 While this point is fiot settled, the possibility exists that pay-
ments made pursuant to a corporate resolution adopted after the death
of the officer, and not made pursuant to contract or preconceived plan,
may be deductible by the corporation and excludible from the widow's
income as a non-taxable gift. 4
Where the business is to be continued by the estate, the corporate
form has the additional advantage of enabling the same taxable entity
to deduct carry-overs and carry-backs of net operating losses. Unless
the same taxpayer were conducting the business, under the Supreme
Court decision in New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvcring,3 the benefit of
carry-overs and carry-backs of net operating losses would be lost. For
this purpose the decedent and his estate would be treated as different
taxpayers.
Another income tax problem which might arise in a partnership, and
which the corporate form eliminates, is readjustment of the basis of the
assets of the partnership by reference to the purchase price paid by a
surviving partner for the decedent's interest. In Nathan Bime ' two
brothers were conducting a mercantile business as a partnership. On
32. The Bureau originally took the view that an estate realized income on the sale
of stock to surviving stockholders pursuant to a stockholders' agreement, based upon the
difference between the basis of the stock to the decedent and the amount realized on the
sale, (special ruling, 5 P-H 1945 FED. TAx SERV. If 76,080 (1945)). However, this ruling
was subsequently revoked (special ruling, 5 P-H 1945 FED. TX SErv. IF 76,295 (1945)) and
the Bureau now holds that the basis of the stock is the date of death value, so that no
income would be realized by the estate unless the proceeds from the sale exceeded the
date of death value.
33. This point is fully discussed in Oberndorfer, Payments to Widows of Deceased Em-
ployees, 25 TaxEs 711 (1947). In I. T. 3329, 1939-2 Cuat. BTmL. 153, the Bureau ruled that
payments made to the widow of a deceased officer (who was also a minority stockholder),
pursuant to a resolution of the corporation adopted after the death, providing for dis-
cretionary voluntary payment of his salary for the balance of the year in which he died
and for the succeeding year, were deductible by the corporation, and non-taxable to the
widow as a gift. Mr. Oberndorfer points out that there is no court decision permitting
both the corporate deduction and exclusion of the payment from the idows income.
34. See Oberndorfer, op. cit. supra note 33, at 719.
35. 292 U. S. 435 (1934).
36. 5 T. C. 702 (1945).
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October 31, 1940, the two brothers agreed to dissolve, and brother A
sold his entire interest in the partnership for $16,500 and an assump-
tion of the partnership liabilities of $43,500 by brother B. As of Octo-
ber 31, 1940, the capital account of B was $30,000. The partnership
had total assets of $120,000, including $49,800 of accounts receivable and
$56,500 of inventory. The Commissioner contended that the basis of
the inventory sold by B after October 31, 1940, was not the basis of
the inventory to the old partnership, but had to be adjusted downward
by reference to the purchase price paid by B."7 A similar downward ad-
justment was made by the Commissioner for the accounts receivable.
As a result of these adjustments, B had additional income for the period
following the purchase. The Tax Court sustained the deficiency result-
ing from the above adjustments, holding that where a partnership is dis-
solved, one partner purchasing the interest of the other, the basis of the
assets must be adjusted by reference to the purchase price paid. Pre-
sumably the Tax Court would apply the same rule where the surviv-
ing partner of a two-man partnership buys the interest of the deceased
partner, whether or not pursuant to a pre-existing contract.
The scope of the Blum case is questionable where the partnership
consists of more than two members 38 (except perhaps where under the
local law the partnership is dissolved even as to survivors upon the
death of a partner). 39 If the business is conducted in corporate form.
the problem of adjustment of the basis of assets on the death of a part-
ner is eliminated since the corporation is a separate and continuing taxa-
ble entity.
C. Use of Insurance to Purchase Business
A common method of raising funds for the purchase of a decedent's
interest in a business is the use of life insurance policies on the de-
cedent's life. The alternatives are for the insurance to be paid to the
business and used by the business to acquire the decedent's interest;
or paid to the surviving business associates and used by them to pur-
$ 90,000
37. The Commissioner contended that the basis of the inventory was $56,500 X $120,000.
The $90,000 was the total of the $16,500 paid by B, the $43,500 of liabilities assumed, and
the $30,000 of B's capital account in the partnership at October 31, 1940.
38. Robert E. Ford, 6 T. C. 499 (1946). But cf. dissenting opinion in Allan S. Lehman,
7 T. C. 1088 (1946), aff'd, 165 F. 2d 383 (C. C. A. 2d 1948), distinguishing the Ford case
from a situation where the partner dies rather than withdraws, and Louis Karsch, 8 T. C.
1327 (1947).
39. There is no case holding this and such authority as there is leans to the contrary.
Cf. Mary D. Walsh, 7 T. C. 205 (1946).
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chase the decedent's interest; or paid to the decedent's estate and ap-
plied against the purchase price payable by the business or the busi-
ness associates of the decedent.
The last alternative seems the least desirable from the income tax
viewpoint. In Paul Legallet4" the decedent and the petitioner were in
business as partners and had an agreement for the purchase by the sur-
vivor of the interest of a decedent. The partnership paid for life insur-
ance policies on the lives of the partners and under the terms of the
policies each insured had the right to designate beneficiaries. It was
agreed that the amount of any insurance should be applied against the
purchase price of the deceased's interest. When one partner died, the
insurance proceeds were paid to. his estate, and the surviving partner,
the petitioner in the proceeding, paid the balance of the purchase price
pursuant to the agreement. Subsequently, the surviving partner sold
partnership assets and included in the basis of the assets sold the amount
of the insurance paid to the deceased's estate. The Board held that
since the amounts were paid by the insurance company directly to the
estate and were included in the decedent's estate tax return as insur-
ance, they were not part of the purchase price paid by petitioner and
could not be included in his basis of assets of the partnership sold by him
after the death of the decedent.
The Legallet case indicates that in order to secure a higher basis for
the survivors, insurance, in a reciprocal purchase plan using insurance,
should be paid to the survivors and used by them to pay for the inter-
est of the decedent.
D. Life Insurance
The proceeds of life insurance paid on the death of the insured are
excluded from income subject to tax under Section 22(b) (1) except
where there has been a transfer of the policy to a person other than
the insured for valuable consideration. 41 If there have been transfers
of life insurance policies for consideration to persons other than the in-
sured, then the difference between (1) the total consideration plus the
premiums paid by the transferee and (2) the proceeds received on the
death of the insured is taxed as ordinary income.'
In order to avoid this income tax to the transferee, it is sometimes
desirable that the life insurance be surrendered and new policies taken
out (assuming that the insured is insurable). In determining whether
40. 41 B. T. A. 294 (1940).
41. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(b) (2)-3 (1943).
42. Cf. Bodine y. Commissioner, 103 F. 2d 982 (C. C. A. 3d 1939).
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such an exchange should be made, a comparison between the potential
income tax cost and the additional cost of the new policies should be
made. Where the potential income tax cost is greater than the addi-
tional cost of new insurance, exchange should be considered.
Under Section 22(b)(1), life insurance proceeds paid on the death
of the insured are excluded from income whether such proceeds are re-
ceived in a lump sum at death or are received in installments pursuant
to an optional method of payment elected either by the insured during
his lifetime or by the beneficiary after the death of the insured.43
This rule can afford substantial tax benefit to heirs of persons with
large means since an investment in life insurance with annuity options
would permit the receipt by the heirs, income tax free, of that part of
each annuity installment consisting of interest.
E. Other Assets
Under Section 113(a)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, the basis
of assets acquired by bequest, devise or inheritance is the fair market
value of the property at the date of death, or at the optional valuation
date if the estate elects to report for federal estate tax purposes under
Section 811(j). The result is that all assets are revalued at the date
of death, or at the optional valuation date, without gain or loss being
recognized for income tax purposes." Where assets owned by a tax-
payer are worth less than their cost for tax purposes, no tax benefit
can be derived from holding the assets, whereas if the assets are sold
before death, the taxpayer may take the loss on his own tax returns.
Where assets are worth more than their tax cost, they pick up a new
basis at the date of death (or optional valuation date) without any in-
come tax on the gain.
Thus, the estate planner might advise the sale of depreciated assets
during taxpayer's lifetime in order to realize the income tax loss and
the retention of assets which have appreciated in order to obtain in-
crease of basis without income tax cost.
F. Inter Vivos Charitable Transfers
A person with a large estate and large annual income, who customarily
gives 15 per cent of his income to charities, and would like to give
more, can benefit from the creation of a trust for charity during his
43. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(b) (1)-1 (1943); Lola G. Bullard, 5 T. C. 1346
(1945); Katharine C. Pierce v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 832 (1943), aff'd, 146 F. 2d 388
(C. C. A. 2d 1944).
44. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.162-1 (1943).
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life with remainder to his estate or heirs. The charitable trust can
either accumulate the income for charitable purposes or pay it out cur-
rently to charities. This is a method of satisfying a philanthropic desire
without depriving the heirs of the corpus or much of the income of the
trusteed assets. Suppose that A owns an estate the top $500,000 of which
on his death pay federal and state estate taxes of 64 per cent and that
his income is in the 75 per cent bracket. If A obtains $20,000 of in-
come per year on the $500,000 of principal and has an expectancy of
ten years, he will receive $200,000 from the fund during the remainder
of his life, or $50,000 net after the 75 per cent income tax. This $50,000
would on his death be subject to the federal and state estate tax of
64 per cent' so that of the income of $200,000 only $18,000 would be
left; $182,000 would have been consumed in taxes.
If A puts the $500,000 into a trust for his life with the income pay-
able to or accumulated for charities, he would not be subject to income
tax on the $200,000 of income; there would be no estate tax on this
sum; he could still give 15 per cent of his income each year to charity;
the trusteed assets would go to his estate; and the $200,000 fund will
be available for charity.
Of course, the trust would have to be drawn in the light of the
Clifford case45 and the Clifford Regulations. 0 A trust of this type was
approved by the eighth circuit in United States v. Pierce.4 7 In this case
the court held the trust valid and the income not taxable to the settlor
in spite of the fact that "one of the motives prompting the creation of
the trust may have been the diminution of the settlor's tax liability on
charitable gifts which she continued to make in large amounts after the
creation of the trust."
III. GENERAL RULES OF TAX LAW RESPECTING INcoME
TAXATION OF ESTATES, TRUSTS AND BENEFICIARIES
Section 162
As a background for the ensuing discussion, the rules respecting the
income taxation of estates, trusts and beneficiaries are summarized:4
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code governs the taxation of trusts
45. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
46. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21 (1943).
47. 137 F. 2d 428, 432 (C. C. A. 8th 1943).
48. Where an estate receives sums to which the decedent was entitled but which were
not reportable in the last return of the decedent and which would have been income if
they had been received by the decedent, such sums are, under § 126, subject to income
tax to the estate in the same manner as they would have been taxed to the decedent. See
supra pp. 2-4; Estate of Thomas F. Remington, 9 T. C. 99 (1947).
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and estates. All income of a trust or estate must be taxed either to the
beneficiary or to the fiduciary, except non-taxable income and income
which is paid to or set aside for charities pursuant to the terms
of the will.4" The mechanics prescribed in Section 162 for taxing the
income either to the fiduciary or to the beneficiary are (1) the allowance
of a deduction to the fiduciary for income of the taxable year which is
distributable in the case of a trust, or which is properly paid or credited
in the case of an estate in administration or a trust providing for dis-
cretionary distribution of income, and (2) the inclusion in the bene-
ficiary's income of the amount of the deduction allowed to the estate or
trust.
Estate in Administration
The income tax liabilities of the fiduciary and beneficiary of an estate
in administration are determined under Section 162(c). That Section
provides that the estate is taxable on all income except that income of
the taxable year which is properly paid or credited during the taxable
year to beneficiaries is deductible by the estate and taxable to the bene-
ficiaries.
Trusts
After the period of administration, where testamentary trusts are
established, the income tax liabilities are determined either under Sec-
tion 162(b), if the income is absolutely payable to the beneficiaries,
or under Section 162(c), if the trust provides for discretionary distribu-
tion of income.
Distributable Income
Under Section 162(b), the beneficiary is taxed on the income of the
trust which is to be distributed currently whether or not it is actually
distributed. The fiduciary obtains a deduction for this amount and is
taxed on the balance of the income. The question whether the income
is to be distributed currently is determined by the applicable state law
and the will. 0 In Mary Hadley Case5 the petitioner was the beneficiary
of a trust of which the "income, profits and proceeds" were payable to
her. During 1941 the trustees granted an option to a third party to
purchase part of the corpus of the trust. Upon default of the third
party, and pursuant to the terms of the option contract, the trustees
received a sum which they credited to corpus and which was not dis-
49. Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U. S. 365 (1933); Estate of Dunlop, P-H 1947 TC
MFar. DEc. SERV. I 47,040 (1947), aff'd, 165 F. 2d 284 (C. C. A. 8t 1948).
50. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 35 (1934). But cf. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. United States, 5 P-H 1948 FED. TAx SERV. ff 72,307 (D. C. Mass. 1948).
51. 8 T. C. 343 (1947).
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tributed. In addition, the trustees realized short term capital gain on
the sale of bonds which was credited to principal and not distributed,
and bond interest was credited to principal to amortize a premium on
the purchase of the bonds and was not distributedr 2 The Commissioner
sought to tax the beneficiary on all of these items on the ground that
they were distributable income. The Tax Court held that the petitioner-
beneficiary was not taxable on these items, although they were income
under the Internal Revenue Code, since under state law the amounts
were properly credited to principal and were not distributable.
Discretionary Trusts
If a trust provides for a discretionary power in the trustee to dis-
tribute or accumulate, then the tax liabilities are determined under
Section 162(c) and the beneficiary is taxed on the income of the taxa-
ble year properly paid or credited to him during such year and the
fiduciary is taxed on the balance of the income.
Annuity Trusts
In the case of an annuity trust, where distribution of a fixed amount
is to be made annually either out of income or out of corpus, the tax
liabilities of the* beneficiary and the fiduciary are determined under
Section 162(d) (1). The beneficiary is taxed on the amount of the
distribution to the extent of the statutory net income for the taxable
year or the distributable income under state law for such year, which-
ever is greaterY3 If the statutory net income or the distributable in-
come under state law of the trust exceeds the amount of the annuity,
then the beneficiary is taxed on the full amount of the annuity and the
excess income is taxed to the fiduciary.
Prior Period Income
The 1942 Revenue Act added provisions dealing with income of a
prior period paid out during the taxable year. As pointed out above,
Section 162(b) and (c) provide for deductions to the fiduciary for in-
come of the taxable year paid or credited under Section 162(c) or dis-
tributable under Section 162(b) to beneficiaries, and require the bene-
ficiaries to include in income the amount deducted by the fiduciary. Sec-
tion 162(d) deals with distributions of income of a prior period and
draws a distinction between income of a prior period distributed after
52. Cf. I. T. 3601, 1943 Cuam. BULL. 412.
53. The operation of this provision is explained in U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.162-2(a)
(1943).
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the first 65 days of the taxable year and that distributed during the
first 65 days of the taxable year.
Section 162 (d) (2) provides that in determining the deductions allowed
to the fiduciary under Section 162(b) and (c) an amount not in excess
of the last 12 months' income of periods preceding the taxable year,
distributed after the first 65 days of the taxable year, is to be treated
as income of the taxable year. The regulation under Section 162(d) (2)
presumes that distributions are made from the most recently accumu-
lated income, so that in the absence of earmarking, for the purposes
of the 12 months rule, the additional deduction is limited to the income
for the months of the preceding period falling within the 12 months
preceding the date of distribution. 4
An example will illustrate this. Suppose the decedent died on Janu-
ary 1, 1946, and the estate has income of $1,000 per month from that
date to May 31, 1947. On June 1, 1947, the fiduciary distributes $12,000
of income. The estate has no other income and makes no further dis-
tributions until May 1, 1948, when it distributes $5,000 and the admin-
istration terminates. The amount of the deduction allowed the estate
on account of prior period income on its 1947 tax return is $7,000, the
income for the period June 1, 1946, to December 31, 1946. In this case
a deduction of $5,000 would also be allowed for the distribution of the
income of the taxable year 1947. If the distribution on June 1, 1947,
were earmarked as 1946 income then the deduction on account of prior
period income for 1947 would be $12,000 and there would be no dis-
tribution of 1947 income.
Section 162 (d)(3)(A) provides that income for a period beginning
prior to the taxable year distributed within the first 65 days of the tax-
able year shall be treated as income of the preceding taxable year dis-
tributed on the last day of the preceding taxable year, to the extent of
the income for the last 12 months of the prior period. In the absence
of earmarking the presumption that distributions are made from the
most recently accumulated income applies.
Suppose the same facts as in the prior example except that $12,000
is distributed on February 28, 1947. Under the presumption, the income
of January and February, 1947, is treated as having been included in
the $12,000 distribution and a deduction would be allowed to the fidu-
ciary under Sections 162(d)(3)(A) and 162(c) for the year 1946
of $10,000, which sum would also be taxed to the beneficiary on his
1946 return.
As these Sections were originally enacted in the Revenue Act of 1942,
54. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.162-2(b) (1943).
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double taxation was possible, since the amount of the fiduciary's de-
duction was the measure of the taxable income reportable by the bene-
ficiary, despite the fact that where the amount of the deduction exceeded
the income of the fiduciary for the taxable year, income tax would ordi-
narily have been paid on the excess by the fiduciary in the earlier tax-
able year. To meet this situation, Section 162(d) (4) was added by
the Revenue Act of .1943. It provides that the beneficiary need not
include in income the excess of the deductions of the fiduciary over
the income of the fiduciary for the taxable year. This provision is effec-
tive to eliminate the double tax on fiduciary income.
An example of the operation of Section 162(d) (2) and (3) (A) and
(4) follows: Suppose a decedent dies on December 31, 1946. During
the calendar year 1947 the estate has income of $10,000. No distribu-
tion of this income is made in 1947 nor within 65 days after the end
of 1947. Since the fiduciary has no deduction for income paid to bene-
ficiaries, the fiduciary pays the tax on the $10,000. During 1948 the
fiduciary has an additional $10,000 of income. On June 1, 1948, he
distributes $10,000 earmarked as the 1947 income, and on December
31, 1948, he distributes the $10,000 of 1948 income. The fiduciary
return for 1948 would show a deduction of $20,000 for income dis-
tributed to beneficiaries. However, the beneficiaries would report only
$10,000 on their 1948 returns since Section 162(d)(4) limits the bene-
ficiaries' taxable income to the estate's distributable income for 1948.
Suppose that, instead of making any distribution during 1948, the
fiduciary distributes the $10,000 of 1947 income on February 1, 1949,
and distributes the remaining $10,000 on June 1, 1949, when the ad-
ministration is terminated. Assume that the fiduciary has no 1949
income. The fiduciary return for 1948 would show $10,000 of income
and $10,000 as a deduction for the 1947 income distributed to bene-
ficiaries. Thus, the fiduciary would pay no tax. The beneficiaries would
include in their 1948 income the $10,000 of 1947 income distributed
on February 1, 1949. The fiduciary 1949 return would show no income
but a deduction of $10,000 for the June 1, 1949, distribution. Since this
deduction exceeds the 1949 income by $10,000, the beneficiaries need
not include the June 1, 1949, distribution in their 1949 income.
Charitable Deduction
Unlike a corporate or individual taxpayer, a trust or estate is entitled
to a deduction for the full amount of its gross income which, pursuant
55. In the example, no adjustment is made for the income taxes that would have been
paid by the estate on the income for 1947.
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to the terms of the will or trust, is paid to or permanently set aside for
a charitable organization or is to be used exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes or for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children or animals or for the establishment, ac-
quisition, maintenance or operation of a public cemetery not operated
for profit. The deduction for charities permitted estates or trusts is
broader than that allowed to individuals or corporations in two re-
spects: (1) There is no percentage limitation on the amount of income
paid or payable to a charity for which a deduction may be obtained.
(2) The income need not be paid to a charitable organization, but it
is sufficient if the money is used or set aside for charitable purposes.
IV. WILL PROVISIONS
Multiple Trusts
As pointed out above, one of the important principles of estate in-
come tax planning is the use of as many different taxpayers as possi-
ble. This may be accomplished by the creation of multiple trusts. Take
a simple example:56 A testator has two minor children. The testamentary
plan is to leave the estate in trust to accumulate the income during their
minority and pay it to them when they attain 21, corpus to grand-
children, if any. If the income from the estate were $20,000 per year,
and the will provided for the creation of a single trust with two bene-
ficiaries, then during the period of minority of the children the trustees
would report the $20,000 of income on one tax return and pay a tax of
$6,900 (with a top bracket of 53.5 per cent). Capital gains of the trust
would be subject to the maximum 25 per cent tax. If the will of the
testator provided for the division of his estate in two equal parts, each
to be held in trust for the benefit of one child, there would be $10,000
of income for each trust, and each trust would pay a tax of $2,500 (with
a top bracket of 36 per cent). Thus, the creation of two trusts in lieu
of one would result in a tax saving of $1,900. If each of the trusts had
$5,000 of capital gain, then the trusts would not pay at the maximum
25 per cent capital gain rate, but would pay capital gains tax at a
19 per cent rate. Each trust would thus pay a capital gains tax of
$950, so that the saving on capital gains tax for the two trusts, as com-
pared to the single trust, would amount to $600. Thus, the total income
tax savings by having two trusts instead of one would be $2,500 for
one year.
Care must be exercised in drafting the will to create separate trusts,
56. This paper was prepared and type set prior to enactment of the Revenue Act of
1948. Accordingly all tax computations are at the rates in effect in 1947.
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if that is the intent. In United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner5T the
settlor, by deed in 1913, created one trust for the benefit of three bene-
ficiaries, with a power of amendment in the beneficiaries. In a subse-
quent year the trust was amended for the purpose of reducing the in-
come tax by providing that the trust estate was to be divided into three
equal parts and each part was separately to be held in trust. The bank
records were changed to reflect the three separate accounts, but the
corpus was held in solido without any physical segregation. The Supreme
Court held that since it was the clear intention that three separate
trusts be created, that being the purpose of the amendments made by
the beneficiaries, and since separate accounts were kept, there were
three separate trusts for tax purposes in spite of the fact that for ad-
ministration purposes the property of the trusts was not physically
segregated.5
To be contrasted with the decision in the United States Trust Co. case
is the recent decision of the Tax Court in Garrard E.Kclly.12 In this case
trusts were set up for X for life, and after X's death, for Y for life, and
after Y's death, for A and B, children of V, the income to be accumu-
lated and distributed to A and B when they reached 30. The tax-payer
contended that with respect to A and B (X and V having died) four sep-
arate trusts were created, two separate trusts of the corpus (one for A
and one for B), and two separate trusts of the accumulated income (one
for A and one for B). The trust deed did not provide for the division
of the corpus into separate shares, but spoke of the beneficiaries' inter-
est in "the trust." The Tax Court held that only one trust was createdco
In most instances multiple trusts as opposed to a single trust with
multiple beneficiaries would satisfy the testamentary plan equally well.
Where this is the intention, the will should direct that the corpus be
divided into separate shares and that each share be held in separate
trust for the beneficiary. Separate accounts should be kept for the
trusts and separate tax returns filed. It is not necessary to have a
57. 296 U. S. 481 (1936).
58. See also Kohtz Family Trust, 6 T. C. 554 (1945). In this case the trustee was
directed to "divide the trust estate into three equal shares" setting aside one share for
each of three children. The share set aside for each child was to be held in trust for such
child. The trust also provided for holding the corpus in solido for administration purposes.
The Tax Court held that three separate trusts were created. The decisive factor was the
intent of the creator of the trusts that there he three trusts, and his direction to divide
the estate in three equal shares and hold each share in trust.
59. 8 T. C. 1269 (1947).
60. Similar results were reached in William T. Belcher Trust No. 1, P-H 1947 TC
MEr. DEc. SaRv. f 47,237 (1947); Edward M. and Fred E. Hiecke Trust, 6 T. C. 30
(1946); James S. Reid Trust, 6 T. C. 438 (1946).
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physical segregation of the corpus, although obviously segregation is
preferable tax-wise to keeping one fund.
Frequently, the testator desires that control over the entire income
of the estate be retained in one person.6' Thus, if the testator has a wife
and two minor children, he may desire the wife to have full control over
the income. Even in such a case, the creation of multiple trusts has
advantages. The control in the wife may be retained by having the wife
as the trustee of three separate trusts, one for her own benefit and one
for the benefit of each of the children. As to the income from the
children's trusts, the wife, as trustee, could have discretion: (1) to pay
out or apply the income for the children's benefit; and (2) to pay the
balance to herself.
The tax benefit to be derived from the suggested plan is demonstrated
by the Tax Court decision in Virginia White. 2 In this case the husband
left to the petitioner, his wife, a life interest in one-half of his estate.
His will contained precatory language that the wife should support,
maintain and educate their two children out of this income. The other
one-half of the estate was left in trust, the income to be accumulated
for the children's benefit. In 1940 the wife used a substantial amount
of the income from her trust for support of the children and contended
that she was taxable on the income of her half of the estate, reduced
by the amount used for support of the children. She argued that the
income she received on her half of the estate was impressed with a trust
for the children. The Tax Court denied her contention and taxed her
income from half the estate without reduction for the amounts expend-
ed for the children. The court held that the precatory language did not
mean that the iricome was impressed with a trust for the children.
If the testator in this case had divided the one-half of the estate left
in trust for the wife into three separate trusts, one for the wife and one
for each of the children, and had directed that the wife apply the income
from the children's trusts for their support, maintenance and education,
any balance of the income to go to the wife, the same distribution of
income would have been achieved from the viewpoint of the three heirs,
but the tax result might have been different. Instead of the wife being
61. If a beneficiary has the unrestricted right in the tax year to demand all the income,
then the beneficiary is taxed under § 22(a) whether or not the income is actually dis.
tributed to him. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-22 (1943). See also Bunting v. Com-
missioner, 164 F. 2d 443 (C. C. A. 6th 1947) ; Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F. 2d 1
(C. C. A. 8th 1945); Stix v. Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 562 (C. C. A. 2d 1945); Busch v.
Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 798 (C. C. A. 8th 1945). But cf. Hallowell v. Commissioner, 160
F. 2d 536 (C. C. A. 3d 1947); Samuel B. Knight, 6 T. C. 90 (1946).
62. 5 T. C. 1082 (1945).
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taxable on all the income, the children might have shared the tax burden
to the extent that the income was used for their support, with reduced
surtax liability on the family's income.'
A ccumulation Trtsts
The Garrard E. Kelly case indicates the extreme to which the number
of taxpayers may be carried. In that case the taxpayer contended that
where the trust provided for the accumulation of income during the
lifetime of two minor beneficiaries, four trusts were created, one trust
of corpus for each of the beneficiaries and one trust of accumulated in-
come for each of the beneficiaries. The contention of the taxpayer was
denied in the Kelly case because the language used did not substantiate
the construction urged of four separate trusts. However, it is possible
to draft a will providing for the creation of a separate trust for accu-
mulated income, with a resulting increase in the number of taxpayers."'
Suppose the testamentary plan is to leave the estate for the benefit of
two minor children and during their minority to apply the income for
their support and maintenance, accumulating the balance. Suppose that
during a given tax year the trust has $20,000 of ordinary income and
$10,000 of capital gain. If only one taxpayer were created, the $20,000
of income would be taxed at $6,900 (with a top bracket of 53.5 per
cent). The $10,000 of capital gain would be subject to the maximum
25 per cent capital gain tax, or $2,500. If the will were drawn to pro-
vide for separate trusts of corpus for each of the children and a separate
trust of income accumulated for each of them, then the two accumu-
lated income trusts would each have incomes of $10,000, and each of
the corpus trusts would have capital gain income of $5,000. The accu-
63. Compare Agnes K. May, 8 T. C. 860 (1947), with Stix v. Commisoner, 1S2 F. 2d
562 (C. C. A. 2d 1945). In the May case the petitioner's parents had set up a trust with
the petitioner as trustee, giving her all the income of the trust except amounts necessary
for the education of the petitioner's children. The petitioner, as trustee was to be the
sole judge of the amounts necessary for such education. The remainder went to petitioner's
issue. During the taxable years, petitioner expended sums on the education of her son,
which sums were separately reported in a tax return filed by the son. The Commissioner
contended that by reason of the control in the petitioner as trustee, she was taxable on
all the income of the trust. The Tax Court held that, under the terms of the trust, the
petitioner was under an obligation to use part of the income for the education of her
children and that on the income so used, the petitioner was not taxable. In the Stix case,
the court taxed the primary beneficiaries (who were also trustees) on income paid
to their children since the taxpayers failed to prove the amount of trust income which
they were under legal obligation pursuant to the trust to pay to the children.
64. George G. Allen, 40 B. T. A. 351 (1939); Lynchburg Trust & Savings Bank v.
Commissioner, 6S F. 2d 356 (C. C. A. 4th 1934).
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mulated income trusts would each pay tax of $2,500. The corpus trusts
would each pay tax of $485. Thus, the total tax liability would be
$5,970, as compared to the total tax liability, if only one trust were cre-
ated, of $9,400.
If, during the taxable year, the accumulated income trusts applied
$5,000 toward the support of each of the children, the tax advantage
would be even greater. In this case each of the two accumulated in-
come trusts and each of the two beneficiaries would report income of
$5,000 and pay a tax of $1,045, or a total tax of $4,180. The corpus
trusts would each pay a tax of $485, so that the total tax liability on
the entire income would be only $5,150, as compared to $9,400 if
there were only one trust and no distribution of income.
Thus, the tax advantage can be derived by putting accumulated in-
come in separate trust. This can be accomplished only by clearly indi-
cating the intention to create separate trusts of corpus and accumulated
income through the use of appropriate language. To gain maximum
flexibility, the will should provide a trust of corpus and direct distribu-
tion of income to a second trust, and authorize accumulation or distri-
bution of such income in the discretion of the trustee."0 In practice such
provision should be implemented by the keeping of separate accounts
by the trustee.
Discretionary Trusts
Where permissible under state law,60 wills providing for discretionary
distribution by trustees achieve a favorable tax result. Such provi-
sion permits analysis by the fiduciary of the relative income tax brack-
ets of the fiduciary and the beneficiaries and the distribution of income
and retention of the balance by the fiduciary to achieve the lowest over-
all surtax bracket. Similar provision might be made to cover distribu-
tions by the executor during the period of administration, so as to give
him the same flexibility in determining whether to distribute or retain
the income of the estate during administration in order to achieve the
lowest over-all surtax bracket.67
Allocation of Expenses
The second important principle of estate income tax planning is the
distribution of taxable income to, or retention of taxable income by, the
taxpayer with the largest amount of income tax deductions. This prin-
65. In some states accumulation is limited to minorities. See, e.g., N. Y. PERS. PROP.
LAW § 16.
66. Ibid.
67. Such a provision might avoid the necessity of obtaining court approval before
making distributions. Cf. Estate of Isadore Zellerbach, 9 T. C. 89 (1947).
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ciple may be implemented by a will provision granting the fiduciary
power to allocate expenses or losses either to income or corpus, in order
to enable the fiduciary to utilize the income tax deductions to the best
possible advantage. Provisions granting- such discretionary powers
have been held effective to set off capital losses against income distri-
butable to a beneficiary, thereby utilizing the deduction for the loss
which would otherwise have been lost. s In another case such a provi-
sion was held effective to permit the charging of an expense against
the income of a beneficiary.69
In the absence of such discretionary power the usual rules of state
law apply to determine whether expenses and losses are to be charged
against income or corpus. Tax deductions which are charges against
income reduce the distributable income which is taxed to the bene-
ficiary, without increasing the income tax of the fiduciary. In Marjorie
V. L. Hudson 0 the petitioner was the life beneficiary of a Pennsylvania
testamentary trust. Included in the trust corpus was realty which the
trustees acquired upon default in 1932 and operated through 1945. In
the tax years in question (1937, 1938 and 1940), the excess expenses of
operating the property over the rental income from the property were
charged by the trustees against the other income of the trust. The
Commissioner contended that the excess expenses were corpus charges
and that the beneficiary should be taxed on the income of the trust with-
out reduction by the excess expenses from operating the realty. If this
contention had been sustained, the beneficiary would have paid tax on
more than the net income of the trust and the deduction for the excess
expenses of operating the realty would have been lost for tax purposes
unless there was other trust income which was not distributable. The
Tax Court made a careful analysis of Pennsylvania law, and concluded
that, as the Pennsylvania law stood in the tax years, the trustee's action
in charging the expenses to income was not clearly wrong.,'
Amounts chargeable against corpus which are tax deductions do not
reduce the distributable income of the beneficiaries and are lost as de-
ductions except where the fiduciary has other income. This was the
68. Florence H. Thornton, 5 T. C. 1177 (1945); Nellie S. Alexander, 36 B. T. A. 929
(1937).
69. Elizabeth F. Wade, 5 T. C. 394 (1945), aff'd, 155 F. 2d 918 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).
But cf. Estate of Mortimer B. Fuller, 9 T. C. 1069 (1947).
70. 8 T. C. 950 (1947).
71. Expenses properly charged to income reduce taxable income of the .beneficiary.
Forrest G. Pearson, 4 T. C. 218 (1944), aff'd, 154 F. 2d 256 (C. C. A. 3d 1946); Minnie
Behl, 7 T. C. 1473 (1946); Bessie B. Hopkinson, 42 B. T. A. 580 (1940), aff'd, 126 F. 2d
406 (C. C. A. 2d 1942).
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case in Charles S. McVeigh,7 2 involving facts similar to those in the
Hudson case, with one difference. In the McVeigh case the will provided
that excess expenses from the operation of a parcel of realty should
be charged to corpus. The taxpayer contended that the excess expenses
were chargeable to income and that the amount distributed to him to
make up the excess realty expenses came from corpus and was not tax-
able. The court held that the excess expenses were chargeable to
corpus under the terms of the will. Thus the beneficiary was taxed on
more than the net income of the trust and the excess realty expense de-
duction was lost.73 If in the McVeigh case the trustee had had the
power to allocate expenses against corpus or income in his discretion,
tax saving might have been effected by allocating the excess realty ex-
pense to income, with the same results as in the Hudson case.
Where the fiduciary has income taxable to him, then a charge against
corpus is not lost as an income tax deduction. Thus, in James H. Knox
Trust74 trustees' commissions were paid out of corpus. The trust had
income held for accumulation and capital gains. The Commissioner con-
tended that the trustees' commissions payable out of corpus were not
an income tax deduction, but the court permitted the deduction under
Section 23(a) (2), and this off-set the otherwise taxable income of the
trust.
The element of income tax planning involved is the giving of dis-
cretionary power to the fiduciary to allocate deductions and losses where
they will do the most good tax-wise. Thus, a fiduciary with such power
may apply capital losses, or excess expenses of real estate, or other de-
ductions, against the beneficiary's income or against the fiduciary's
so as to obtain maximum tax advantage.
Obviously there are limits to the usefulness of this device. Such allo-
cation of expenses and losses changes the substantive rights of the par-
ties involved. If capital losses are charged against income, the life
beneficiary receives less income. Discretionary allocation has particular
72. 3 T. C. 1246 (1944).
73. See also Gertrude Libbey Anthony, 9 T. C. 956 (1947); Mary deF. Harrison
Geary, 9 T. C. 8 (1947); Irma L. Harris, 5 T. C. 493 (1945); I. T. 3830, 1946-2 Cum.
BULL. 47; Augusta Bliss Reese, 30 B. T. A. 1 (1934).
74. 4 T. C. 258 (1944).
75. Charges against income which are not tax deductions reduce the distributable In-
come taxable to the beneficiary, but result in taxing the fiduciary on an equal amount.
Mary Helen Cadwalader, 27 B. T. A. 1078 (1933) ; cf. Estate of Mortimer B. Fuller, 9
T. C. 1069 (1947). Charges against corpus which are not tax deductions do not reduce
the distributable income taxable to the beneficiary, and cannot result in tax benefit to the
fiduciary. Anna F. Ardenghi, 37 B. T. A. 345 (1938), aff'd, 100 F. 2d 406 (C. C. A. 2d
1938).
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value where the beneficiary entitled to the income will ultimately get
the corpus. If the testamentary plan is to keep the estate in trust until
the beneficiary reaches 30 and then to distribute the corpus to the bene-
ficiary, the tax advantages from charging expenses and losses against
income otherwise distributable to the beneficiary may outweigh the im-
mediate disadvantage to the beneficiary of receiving less income.7"
Dollar Bcqucsts
Where the testator plans to leave a large portion of his estate out-
right to a legatee, consideration should be given to the question whether
such bequest should be in the form of a percentage of the residue of
the estate or in the form of a fixed dollar amount. While an estate
ordinarily does not realize income by a distribution to legatees of assets
in kind,7 an estate does realize income by payment of a bequest of a
fixed dollar amount with securities which have appreciated in value.
Thus, in Kenan v. Commissioner s the beneficiary was entitled to
$5,000,000 to be paid either in cash or, at the discretion of the fiduciary,
in securities. The fiduciary satisfied the bequest with securities which
had appreciated in value, and the court held that the fiduciary had
realized income despite the distribution in kind. In this case, a bequest
of a percentage of the residue might have been more advantageous tax-
wise. The desirability of a percentage bequest from the income tax view-
point must be weighed with the desire of the testator as to whether the
estate or the beneficiary should take the risk of depreciation in the value
of the estate after the date of death.
Distribution in Kind or Cash
Even where the bequest is of a portion of the residue, it would be
advantageous to include a provision in the will granting the fiduciary
discretion to satisfy the bequest by distributions in kind or in cash.
This would enable the fiduciary to determine at the time of distribution
whether gains or losses have occurred with respect to the estate's assets
and the most economical way to handle the assets from the income
76. Discretionary allocation provisions must also be read in the light of the local law,
which may limit the trustee's scope of action. Cf., e.g., Caroline Gove Doty, 3 T. C. 1013
(1944), aff'd, 148 F. 2d 503 (C. C. A. 1st 1945), where a dividend was held taxable to
the beneficiary despite its allocation to corpus by the trustee, on the ground that under
local law such dividend was distributable despite the trustees discretionary power.
77. Cf. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Commisioner, 296 U. S. 200 (1935).
78. 114 F. 2d 217 (C. C. A. 2d 1940). See also Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. C.
Conn. 1935), aff'd, 83 F. 2d 1019 (C. C. A. 2d 1936); cf. John H. Brinckerhoff, 8 T. C.
1045 (1947).
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tax point of view. Thus, if an estate .has substantial income in the
year of distribution, sale of depreciated assets by the fiduciary may be
indicated to offset the income by the loss to the extent permissible. On
the other .hand, if the fiduciary has no income and some of the bene-
ficiaries have substantial income, distribution of depreciated assets to
the beneficiaries and sale of the assets by them in order to realize the
tax loss might be indicated. Similarly, if the estate has realized losses,
appreciated assets should be sold by the estate in order to minimize the
tax on the gain. If the estate has no losses, but the beneficiaries have
losses, then distribution of the assets in kind and their sale by the bene-
ficiaries may be the most economical method from the tax viewpoint.
Realty
Where realty owned by the testator is sold after his death, the proper
taxpayer to report gain or loss on the sale depends upon the terms of
the will and local law. Where realty is left outright to the heirs and
under local law descends to the heirs at date of death, gain or loss
on a sale by the heirs is reported on their tax returns whether the sale
is made during or after the period of administration." If the will di-
rects a sale of the realty and transfer of the proceeds to the heirs and
under local law the heirs have no interest in the realty but only in the
proceeds, gain or loss on sale is reportable by the estate.80
Where the realty is left to the heirs subject to a power of sale in the
executors, whether gain or loss is taxed to the estate or to the heirs de-
pends on whether the executor has powers of management over the
realty in addition to the power of sale. If he has only the power of sale,
gain or loss is reportable by the heirs.81
Rental income and expense with respect to realty which descends to
the heirs at date of death under the will and local law are reported by
the heirs, 2 but if it is not shown that the realty and rental income will
not be needed to pay debts, legacies and expenses of the estate, one case
holds that rental income and expense are reported by the estate.s3
79. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.162-1 (1943); Sayers F. Harman, 4 T. C. 335 (1944);
Radin v. Commissioner, 33 F. 2d 39 (C. C. A. 3d 1929).
80. Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U. S. 20 (1933); Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 34 B. T. A.
528 (1936); G. C. M. 12771, XIII-1 Cum. BULL. 148 (1934).
81. Weber v. Commissioner, 111 F. 2d 766 (C. C. A. 2d 1940); cf. James W. Arrott,
Jr., 23 B. T. A. 478 (1931).
82. Abbot v. Welch, 31 F. Supp. 369 (D. C. Mass. 1940); Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y.,
30 B. T. A. 314 (1934) ; George L. Craig, 7 B. T. A. 504 (1927) ; S. M. 2673, 111-2 Cus.
BULL. 177 (1924) ; I. T. 1596, 11-1 CuAr. BULL. 130 (1923) ; A. R. M. 151, 1-1 Cuim. BULL.
214 (1922).
83. Estate of B. Brasley Cohen, 8 T. C. 784 (1947). In this case, the will provldcd
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If it is desired that rental income and expense and gain or loss on the
sale of realty be reported by the heirs for tax purposes, this might be
done under the Weber case84 by devising the realty to the heirs subject
only to a naked power of sale in the executor. But the maximum tax
flexibility in handling realty can be achieved by devising realty to the
heirs, subject to powers of sale and management in the executor pend-
ing transfer of possession to the heirs or sale by the executor, coupled
with a clause giving the executor discretion to charge expenses either
to income or corpus.
Under such provisions, rental income and expense would be reported
by the fiduciary prior to transfer of possession to the heirs. If rental
income exceeds the expense, the tax burden could be borne either by
the executor or by the heir (through distributions of the income) which-
ever were cheaper tax-wise. If the expenses exceed the rental income,
the executor could charge the excess against income or corpus; tax
benefit would result from the charge against corpus only if the executor
retained sufficient other income to off-set the deduction.8
Similarly, if sale is contemplated and tax analysis indicates that the
fiduciary should report the gain or loss, then the fiduciary should sell.
If better tax results would be achieved by having the heir report the
gain or loss, then the fiduciary should transfer possession so that sale
could be made by the heir.
Charitable Deduction
As pointed out above, a trust or estate is entitled, under Section 162 (a)
of the Internal Revenue Code, to a charitable deduction for all income
which, pursuant to the will or deed, is paid to or permanently set aside
for charitable purposes. The deduction for charitable contributions al-
lowed an estate or trust differs from the charitable deduction allowed
individuals and corporations in two important aspects:
for distribution of the residue to named individuals. Included in the corpus of the estate
was realty from which rental income was realized during the taxable period in question.
This income was received by the fiduciary and none of it was distributed to the heirs
during the tax year. The estate contended that the rental income should be reported by
the heirs on their returns, since under the applicable California law the title to the realty
vested in the heirs at date of death. The Tax Court held that the rental income was tax-
able to the estate, although it recognized that the title to the real estate descended to the
heirs at the date of death. The ground of the decision was that under local California
law, apart from the will, a fiduciary has management powers to enable use of realty or
rental income to pay debts if necessary and that under the facts of the case it was not
shown that the realty and rental income would not be used to meet the taxes of the estate.
84. 111 F. 2d 766 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
85. See supra, pp. 22-24 and notes 71, 73 and 75 supra.
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First, there is no limitation on the amount which may be paid to or
permanently set aside for charities and allowed as an income tax deduc-
tion to an estate or trust, whereas, in the case of individuals and cor-
porations, the deduction is limited to a percentage of gross income.
Second, the charitable deduction of an estate or trust is broader than
in the case of individuals and corporations. In the latter cases, the
deduction is allowed only for payments to specified types of organiza-
tions. In the case of estates and trusts, the deduction is allowed for
amounts paid to or set aside for any of the organizations to which an
individual or corporation may contribute and obtain a tax deduction,
and in addition a deduction is allowed for any income which is used
(or held for use) exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary
or educational purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals or for the establishment, acquisition, maintenance or oper-
ation of a public cemetery not operated for profit, even though such
use is by the trust or estate itself without payment to a charitable
organization.
The difference between the amount of charitable deduction allowed
an estate or trust and that allowed an individual or corporation is dem-
onstrated in John E. Andrus Trust No. 1P' In this case 45 per cent of
the income of the trust was set aside for charitable purposes. The in-
come so set aside included capital gains. The trustees claimed a chari-
table deduction for the full amount of the income set aside, or $37,000,
without reducing the capital gains to the amount of the long term capi-
tal gain income included in gross income under Section 117. The Com-
missioner contended that the charitable deduction was limited to the
amount of taxable income set aside for charities, after reducing the
capital gain income by the applicable percentages under Section 117,
or $17,800. The trustees argued that under Section 162(a) the trust
was entitled to a deduction for income which, pursuant to the terms of
the trust, was paid to or set aside for charities "without limitation," and
that the quoted language required that the amount of the income paid
to or set aside for charities be allowed as a deduction before reducing
the capital gain income by the percentage requirements. The Tax Court
sustained the trustees, and as the trust had other income subject to
tax, the allowance of a charitable deduction of $37,100 enabled $19,300
of other taxable income to escape taxation (the deduction under the
Commissioner's construction was $17,800).
The second circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that while the
86. 7 T. C. 573 (1946), rev'd sub non. Commissioner v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 163 F. 2d 208 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
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full amount paid to or permanently set aside for charities is a tax de-
duction, the deduction is limited to the amount included in taxable gross
income. Thus, although the trust actually paid to or permanently set
aside $37,100 for charitable purposes, the deduction of the trust was
limited to the $17,800 included in taxable gross income. The court
relied on an analogy to the treatment of expenses incurred in connec-
tion with exempt income, which are not deductible to the extent at-
tributable to the exempt income. s
The second difference is demonstrated in Commissioner v. Citizens &
Southern Nat. Bank.ss In this case decedent left his entire estate (sub-
ject to two annuities and to other annual payments to be made to his
former wife and his widow) to be used for "charity purposes and in
the relief of pain and suffering and poverty." The will directed that a
corporation be organized to take over the estate and that, after pay-
ment of the annuities (and the payments to decedent's two former
spouses), one-fourth of the income be used for orphanages. The balance
was to be used for charity, including disbursement of the funds "to in-
dividuals who are deserving and to other deserving institutions such as
schools, whether the same be public or private, and iht fact, any... de-
serving individual, association or institution that said Trustees may
deem worthy and in need of the funds herein provided for without
regard to race, color or creed.'"s
During the tax years in question, the estate had substantial income
and claimed deduction under Section 162(a) for the excess income re-
maining after the payments to the individuals. The Commissioner de-
nied the deduction on the ground that the income was not paid to or
permanently set aside for the use of charitable foundations described in
Section 23(o) (institutions to which contributions by individuals are
deductible), since the corporation (to be formed under the will) had to
pay out annuities and might use the funds for private individuals and
private schools. The Tax Court allowed the deduction on the ground
that under Section 162(a) deduction is not based on payment to an
organization described in Section 23(o); it is sufficient if the funds are
used (or held) for charitable purposes. The court pointed out that
the charitable deduction under Section 162(a) is to be construed liber-
ally and that the deduction was allowable even though under the will
payments were permitted to needy individuals or private schools.°
87. INT. RE . CODE § 24(a) (5); see George N. Meissner, 8 T. C. 780 (1947).
88. 147 F. 2d 977 (C. C. A. 5th 1945), affirming 3 T. C. 40 (1944).
89. Id. at 42.
90. Other decisions broadly constrting the charitable deduction for estates and trusts are:
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U. S. 379 (1937); Estate of Edward T. Bed-
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Whether income is paid to or permanently set aside for charities is
a question of fact. The possibility that funds set aside for charity may
be used for individuals is not sufficient to deny the deduction, if it can be
established that the funds will not in fact be diverted to the individu-
als." To avoid any problem where income is not paid to charities ddring
the tax year, but is held for future distribution to charities, it is sug-
gested that a separate trust be created by the will, all of the income and
corpus of which is to go to charities, and that any funds held for dis-
tribution to charities be paid into this trust. Suppose that a will creates
a trust and provides that as much income as necessary be paid by, the
trustees for the support of the beneficiary, and that upon the bene-
ficiary's death all the principal and unused income be paid to charities.
A charitable deduction for the excess income in this case might be
denied because of the possible use of income for the individual bene-
ficiary. 2 But it would seem that the deduction would be allowed if the
will provided that the excess income be paid into a separate trust to
be held for charities, since such income would then be permanently set
aside for charities and would not be subject to use in any other manner.
A similar provision is desirable where corpus is held for charity sub-
ject to possible invasion for the benefit of the life tenant. If the trust
has capital gains, the government could take the position that the capi-
tal gains are not permanently set aside for charity in view of the possi-
bility of invasion and are therefore subject to tax. 3 A direction in the
will to pay the capital gains into a separate trust to be held for chari-
table purposes would appear to justify deduction of the capital gains
as income permanently set aside for charities.
V. INCOME TAX CONSIDERATIONS WHILE THE ESTATE
IS IN ADMINISTRATION
Estate Tax Return
The preparation of the federal estate tax return presents two income
tax problems: Should the property be valued at the date of death or
at the optional valuation date? Should administration expenses and
other deductions be claimed as income tax deductions or as estate tax
deductions?
ford, 39 B. T. A. 1039 (1939); cf. Edward Orton Jr. Ceramic Foundation, 9 T. C. 533
(1947).
91. Commissioner v. Upjohn's Estate, 124 F. 2d 73 (C. C. A. 6th 1941); F. G. Bonfils
Trust, 40 B. T. A. 1085 (1939), af'd, 115 F. 2d 788 (C. C. A. 10th 1940).
92. Charles P. Moorman Home for Women v. United States, 42 F. 2d 257 (W. D. Ky.
1930).
93. See William P. Allen, 6 T. C. 597 (1946) ; Estate of Edward A. Langenbach, 46
B. T. A. 600 (1942), aff'd, 134 F. 2d 590 (C. C. A. 6th 1943).
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Under Section 113(a)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, the basis
of property acquired by bequest, devise or inheritance is the value of
the property on the date of acquisition. The date of acquisition is the
date of death unless the executors elect to value the estate for federal
estate tax purposes at the optional valuation date, one year after death,
under Section 811(j). In the latter case, the property is treated as hav-
ing been acquired at the optional valuation date and its value on that
date is the income tax basis of the property.
In the usual situation, the estate consists of many assets, some of
which have appreciated in value and some of which have depreciated
in value in the year following the death. No categorical rule for the
election of either the date of death value or the optional value can be
stated. The executor must make an over-all analysis, listing the assets
which are to be sold, comparing the income tax cost on such sale (using
both date of death and optional valuations) with the estate tax cost if
the date of death or optional value date is used, determining the tax
benefit from income tax losses which could be realized by the estate
or heirs and then electing the estate tax valuation date which results
in the lowest over-all total of estate and income taxes.
Whether the deductions allowed under Section 812(b) as estate tax
deductions, should be taken as deductions under Section 812(b) or
Section 23 (as income tax deductions) depends upon the relative estate
tax and income tax brackets of the estate. If the estate will be in a
higher income than estate tax bracket, it should forego the deduction
under Section 812(b) and take the deduction under Section 23. Where
no federal estate tax return is filed (net estate under $60,000) then the
expenses and other deductions should be claimed on the income tax
returns.94
Period of Administration
During the period of administration, the heirs are taxable only on
income properly paid or credited to them, the estate being taxable on
the balance."a This rule permits flexibility, since the executor can deter-
mine how much of the income should be distributed and how much re-
tained in order to achieve the lowest over-all surtax rate. For this
reason, it is usually desirable to prolong the period of administration.
The Treasury Regulation provides that the period of administration is
94. In a special ruling reported in 5 P-H 1947 FED. TAX Semv. E 76,136 (1947), it was
held that where no estate tax return was filed because of the insufficiency of the estate,
administration expenses could be deducted on the income tax returns, if the estate filed
a waiver foregoing the right to ciaim the expenses as an estate tax deduction at any time.
See also special ruling reported in 5 P-H 1948 FED. TAX SERV. ff 76,153 (1948).
95. See part III supra.
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not dependent upon local rules of law, but is the time required by the
executor or administrator to perform the ordinary duties pertaining
to administration, in particular the collection of assets and the payment
of debts and legacies." Where the time required for administration of
the estate has ended, even though the assets are still held by the execu-
tor, the income of the estate will be taxed to the heirs under Section
162(b). That is, after the period of administration, except in the case
of an accumulation trust or a trust providing for discretionary distri-
bution or accumulation, the income is taxed to the beneficiaries if dis-
tributable, whether or not actually distributed. In William C. Chick 7
the testator died in 1929 leaving his assets to residuary trusts, one for
the benefit of each of his two children. By 1937 all the debts and lega-
cies of the estate had -been paid, but the residuary trusts had not been
set up, nor had any of the income of these trusts been paid or credited
to the two, beneficiaries, one of whom was also the executor. The Tax
Court held that in 1940 the estate was out of administration even though
the administration had not been terminated in the local state court; the
income of the estate was taxable to the two beneficiaries even though it
had not been distributed.
That the courts will not unduly limit the period of administration
appears from Caro du Bignon Alston. 8 In this case the testator died
on February 4, 1938. The petitioner was the executor and also a residu-
ary legatee. By January, 1941, all the debts of the estate had been paid.
In the fall of 1942, the executor accounted and distributed the assets
to the beneficiaries. The Commissioner contended that during 1941 the
estate was out of administration and that the income was taxable to
the beneficiaries and not to the estate. The Tax Court held that the
reasonable time required for the administration included the accounting
and distribution, which were not unduly prolonged, and that the estate
was in administration during the year 1941.
96. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.162-1 (1943). In Frederich v. Commissioner, 145 F.
2d 796 (C. C. A. 5th 1944), the court held that by reason of the local Florida law, an
estate was in administration from 1934 through 1943 in spite of the fact that all of the
debts of the estate had been paid by 1937. In this case the decedent's interest in a part-
nership was continued by the administrator, and the continuation of such interest was
approved by the Florida courts. The fifth circuit held that since the estate was properly
continued in administration under the Florida law, the heirs could not be taxed on income
of the estate not actually distributed. The Tax Court has refused to follow the Frederich
decision. See William C. Chick, 7 T. C. 1414, 1422 (1946), aff'd, 5 P-H 1948 FED. TAx
SERV. f[ 72,384 (C. C. A. 1st 1948).
97. 7 T. C. 1414 (1946), aff'd, 5 P-H 1948 FEo. TAx SERV. ff 72,384 (C. C. A. 1st 1948).
98. 8 T. C. 525 (1947) . See also Marie B. Hirsch, 9 T. C. 896 (1947).
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Residuary Trusts
Where the will provides for the creation of trusts, it is advisable to
set the trusts up at an early date in order to create more taxpayers.
Payment of income by the estate to the trusts would shift the tax on
such income to the trusts,00 or to the beneficiaries if the income were
distributable by the trusts. Where the income of the trust can be par-
tially accumulated, then additional tax advantage is derived by having
the trust distribute only part of the income so that the tax burden is
spread three ways among the estate, the trust and the beneficiary, there-
by reducing the over-all surtax bracket. In addition to the advantage
of splitting the tax on the ordinary income among the three taxpayers,
under present law it is possible that the tax on the capital gain income
may also be split. Prior to 1942, where income was distributed as cor-
pus (as in the case of final distribution to a residuary legatee after
the estate realized capital gain), the estate was not entitled to a de-
duction for the income so distributed. Such amounts were taxable in-
come to the estate and not taxable to the legatee."' Under the law since
1942, an estate is entitled to a deduction for all income distributed, even
if it is distributed as corpus,1 1 except for payments of legacies pay-
able in one sum." -
The foregoing may be illustrated by the following example. Suppose
that in the tax year the estate has ordinary income of $20,000 and capi-
tal gain income of $20,000. If no income were distributed, the estate
would pay $6,900 on the $20,000 of ordinary income and be in the 53.5
per cent bracket; it would pay capital gains tax at 25 per cent, or a total
tax of $11,900. If the estate distributed $10,000 of the income to a
beneficiary, then the beneficiary would pay a tax of $2,500, the estate
would pay a tax of $2,500 on its ordinary income and a capital gains
tax of $3,600. If a residuary trust were created, and if the estate dis-
tributed $10,000 of ordinary income and $10,000 of capital gain to the
residuary trust, and the trust distributed the $10,000 of ordinary income
to the beneficiary, it is believed that the estate would pay a tax
99. See G. C. M. 24702, 1945 Cur. BULL. 241; Estate of Robert NV. Harwood, 3 T. C.
1104 (1944); note 60 supra. See also Boston Safe.Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States,
5 P-H 1948 FED. TAx SERv. ff 72,307 (D. C. Mass. 1948).
100. See G. C. M. 24749, 1945 Cumr. BULL. 237. See also United States v. Britten, 161
F. 2d 921 (C. C. A. 3d 1947); Estate of Dunlop, P-H 1947 TC MEa!. Dre. Smow. gi 47,040
(1947), aft'd, 165 F. 2d 284 (C. C. A. 8th 1948); Burchenal v. Commissioner, 150 F.
2d 482 (C. C. A. 6th 1945).
101. Hazel Kirk Carlisle, 8 T. C. 563 (1947), aff'd, 5 P-H 1948 FED. TA.: Sarv.
ff 72,351 (C. C. A. 6th 1948); G. C. M. 24702, 1945 Cur. BuLL. 241.
102. G. C. M. 24702, supra note 101; Old Colony Trust Co., 38 B. T. A. 828 (1938).
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of $2,500 on the ordinary income and $1,800 on the capital gain;
the beneficiary would pay $2,500 on the $10,000 of ordinary in-
come; and the trust would pay $1,050 on the $10,000 of capital
gain. If this method of reporting were sustained, the total tax
liability would be $7,850, as compared with" a total tax liability of
$11',900 where the estate reported all of the income, and $8,600 where
a residuary trust was not set up but partial distribution was made to
a beneficiary. If the trust were authorized by the will and local law
to accumulate part of the ordinary income, and did so, the over-all tax
would be even lower. Numerous combinations resulting in tax savings
are possible, especially if there are several trusts to work with.
Fiscal Year
Additional flexibility is afforded by putting the estate on a fiscal year
basis. In the case of an estate in administration, where the tax year
of the estate and of the beneficiary differ, the beneficiary is taxed on
income in the year in which it is paid or credited to him. °3 This rule
enables the fiduciary to distribute the income of one taxable year of the
estate in two taxable years of the beneficiary. Suppose the decedent
dies June 30, 1947, and the estate has $50,000 of ordinary income and
$50,000 of capital gain income by December 31, 1947. The estate dis-
tributes $25,000 of ordinary income to the beneficiary on December 31,
1947. The balance of 25,000 of ordinary income is distributed to the
beneficiary on April 15, 1948. If the estate reports on a calendar year
basis, then its tax return for 1947 shows $25,000 of net income (after
deducting the amount distributed to the beneficiary under Section
162(c)) and $50,000 of capital gain. The estate pays a tax of $9,650
on the ordinary income and $12,500 on the capital ghin. the bene-
ficiary includes the $25,000 in income for 1947 and, assuming he has
no other income, pays a tax of $9,650. Under Section 162(d)(2) and
(4), the distribution in 1948 would result in no tax to the beneficiary
(assuming the estate has no other income in 1948). Thus, the total tax
liability would be $31,800.
If the estate were on a fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, the return
for that perioa for the estate would show $50,000 of capital gain income
(after deducting the $50,000 distributed to the beneficiary in 1947 and
1948 under Section 162(c)), and the estate would pay a tax of $9,650.
The beneficiary would report $25,000 in 1947 and pay a tax of $9,650,
and would report $25,000 in 1948 and again pay $9,650. Thus, the total
tax liability on the same income would be $28,950, a saving of $2,850
103. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 25 B. T. A. 252 (1932).
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in taxes. It is possible that further flexibility may be obtained by setting
up testamentary trusts early in the administration and placing them on
a different fiscal year from the estate. Unlike distributions from estates
(which are taxed to the beneficiary in the year received), distributions
from a trust, the income of which is distributable, are taxed to the bene-
ficiary in the taxable year of the beneficiary in which the fiscal year
of the trust ends."°4 This rule may permit the beneficiary to report
over three taxable years income received by the estate in one taxable
year.
The foregoing may be illustrated by the following example: The de-
cedent dies on March 31, 1947. The estate is put on a fiscal year end-
ing March 31st. For the fiscal year ending March 31, 1948, the estate
has ordinary income of $50,000. Of this, $15,000 is distributed to the
beneficiary (who reports on a calendar year basis) in the calendar year
1947. An additional $15,000 is distributed to the beneficiary by the
estate on January 31, 1948, and is reported in the beneficiary's 1948
return. On February 1, 1948, the testamentary trust is established and
the estate distributes $20,000 to the trust. The trust elects to report on
a fiscal year basis ending January 31st. The income of the trust which
is distributed to the beneficiary is reported in the beneficiary's calen-
dar year 1949, the year in which the fiscal year of the trust ends. This
is so even though the trust income is distributed by the trust to the bene-
ficiary during 1948.0
Earmarking Income
Where the distribution of the income of a taxable year is made after
the close of the taxable year without being earmarked, it is treated as
having been made from the most recently accumulated income.' In
this way, income tax planning can be partially nullified by failure to
earmark. Suppose that on May 15, 1948, the fiduciary of an estate
having a taxable year ending March 31, 1948, distributes $50,000 of
income to beneficiaries. Assume the estate has $10,000 of income be-
tween April 1, 1948, and May 15, 1948. Unless the income were ear-
marked, only $40,000 of the income for the fiscal year ending March
31, 1948, would be treated as deductible by the fiduciary and taxable
104. NeT. REv. CODE § 164.
105. There is no decision on this point. In order to minimize tax riss, it would be
desirable for the estate to distribute corpus as well as income to the residuary trusts,
and for the residuary trusts to be actually set in operation. If the residuary trusts only
received income which they were immediately required to distribute, the Government might
take the position that the setting up of the residuary trusts was a sham, and should be
ignored for tax purposes. Cf. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935).
106. Pp. 15-17 supra.
19481
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to the beneficiary for that taxable year. To avoid the complications
arising from this presumption, the income of each period should be
earmarked when distributed. To facilitate earmarking, the fiduciary
should consider keeping the income of each taxable year in a separate
bank account.
Income to be Distributed
As above pointed out, unless the income of a fiduciary is distributed
within the the first sixty-five days after the close of the taxable year, such
income is taxed to the fiduciary. Accordingly, within the first sixty-five
days after the close of the taxable year, the fiduciary should analyze the
income and deductions of the various taxpayers and then distribute
income so as to achieve the lowest over-all tax bracket. The safest
course would be the preparation of tentative income tax returns for
each of the beneficiaries and for the estate within the sixty-five days
following the close of the estate's taxable year. Adjustments to achieve
the lowest over-all surtax could then be made through distributions by
the estate of the taxable income for the year within the sixty-five days.
The amount of income which should be distributed by the fiduciary
to the beneficiary in any taxable year depends upon an analysis of
the surtax brackets of the beneficiary and the fiduciary, taking into
account the income tax deductions available to each and the nature
of the income (whether Section 126 income, ordinary income or capi-
tal gain income).
The treatment of income tax deductions available to the fiduciary
and beneficiary has been discussed. 0 7 The effect of the nature of the
income on the determination of the amount of the distribution may be
illustrated by the following example: Suppose that an estate has the
right to receive income in respect of a decedent which, when received,
will be subject to tax under Section 126. Suppose that the capitalized
value of the income had previously been included in the estate tax
return so that a deduction of a part of the estate tax will be available
for income tax purposes under Section 126(c). If there are two bene-
ficiaries, A and B, and A is in a higher surtax bracket than B (without
consideration of the fiduciary income), distribution of the right to re-
ceive the income might be made to A since, by reason of the deduction
under Section 126(c) and A's higher surtax bracket, there will be greater
tax benefit than if the right were transferred to B and fully taxable in-
come were distributed to A. A similar analysis can be made with re-
spect to such capital gain income of the trust as may be distributed,
107. Pp. 22-25 supra.
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since capital gain income of the fiduciary distributed to the beneficiary
is probably taxable as capital gain to the beneficiary.18s Once the
amount to be distributed is determined, the amount must either be paid
or credited to the beneficiary. 09 The requirement of payment or credit
is not satisfied by a mere bookkeeping entry,"" nor by the fact that the
beneficiaries reported the income on their individual returns."' To
insure taxation of the income during the period of administration to
the beneficiaries, either payment should be made or the following con-
ditions should exist: (1) appropriate entry should be made in the
books crediting the beneficiary's account; (2) the beneficiary should
be notified that the funds are available to him; (3) funds should ac-
tually be available for withdrawal by the beneficiary; and (4) the bene-
ficiary should report the income on his individual tax return.1 2
108. Hazel Kirk Carlisle, 8 T. C. 563 (1947), a'ffd, S P-H 1948 Frm. TAx SERv. E 72,351
(C. C. A. 6th 1948). See also special ruling reported in 5 P-H 1948 FED TAx Strv. f 76,22S
(1948).
109. Frank v. Commissioner, 5 P-H 1948 FED TAx SE v. f 72, 361 (C. C. A. 3d 1948).
The rule that during the period of administration, the beneficiary is taxed only on in-
come paid or credited to him applies even where provision is made that the income is
to be paid to the beneficiary from the date of death. The courts have held that such pro-
vision does not require the executor to pay out the income during the period of adminis-
tration. First Nat. Bank of Memphis, 7 T. C. 1428 (1946); Estate of Peter A. Bruner,
3 T. C. 1051 (1944).
110. Commissioner v. Stearns, 65 F. 2d 371 (C. C. A. 2d 1933); Estate of Peter A.
Bruner, supra note 109.
111. Estate of B. Brasley Cohen, 8 T. C. 784 (1947).
112. See Estate of Andrew J. Igoe, 6 T. C. 639 (1946).
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